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A COMPETITIVE PROCESS FOR
PROCURING HEALTH SERVICES:
A Review of Principles with an
Application to Cataract Services




Government agencies employ a variety of mechanisms for securing goods
and services from the private sector. These include posting prices,
reimbursing for costs, and soliciting competitive bids.   Procurement of
healthcare services offers several unique challenges. The supplier can
influence the quantity of services provided. It is often difficult to even
specify in advance exactly what services are to be purchased. Lastly,
quality is difficult to measure.   Healthcare purchasers have deployed a
variety of payment mechanisms to cope with these challenges.  We apply
the theory of procurement to the case of cataract surgery. We recommend
implementing a system that combines a gatekeeper with competitive
bidding among operating physicians who must perform all necessary
services, including treatment for complications, within a global fee.   We
conclude by discussing the strengths and limitations of this proposal.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Government agencies employ a variety of mechanisms for securing goods and services from
the private sector. These include posting prices, reimbursing for costs, and soliciting
competitive bids.
The choice of procurement scheme depends on a variety of factors, such as the presence of
competing suppliers, the extent to which productive efficiency varies across providers, the
degree of product differentiation, asymmetry of information between buyer and seller, and the
importance of a fair and transparent procurement mechanism.
Procurement of health care services offers several unique challenges: the supplier can influence
the quantity of services provided, it is often difficult even to specify in advance exactly what
services are to be purchased, and quality is difficult to measure.
Health care purchasers have deployed a variety of payment mechanisms, each with its own
strengths and weaknesses. Ideally, the choice of mechanism should be tailored to the
characteristics of the service being purchased. Characteristics to consider include whether
providers can influence demand for the service, whether it is difficult to adjust payments for
patient severity, whether there is substantial variation in quality, and whether it is easy to
measure and reward high quality. 
The example of cataract surgery offers an excellent opportunity to explore new methods for
procurement: the product is well defined, costs do not depend on patient characteristics, and it
is easy to measure quality. Demand, however, is easily induced. We recommend implementing
a system that combines a gatekeeper with competitive bidding among operating physicians
who must perform all necessary services, including treatment for complications, within a
global fee. This should allow Alberta Health Services to secure high-quality services at low
prices while keeping to a global budget cap. Competitive bidding is not without risks, however,
and Alberta Health Services might need to consider several modifications to traditional bidding
schemes.
INTRODUCTION
In Alberta, the body responsible for managing the provision of health care services to residents
of the province is Alberta Health Services, which is also tasked with the challenge of ensuring
access to high-quality care while keeping to a limited budget. In this report, we evaluate
alternative approaches to procuring health care services. We begin by outlining general
concepts applicable to different procurement methods, and proceed to a detailed description of
methods tailored to health care settings. After considering empirical evidence of the
effectiveness of these methods, we summarize our analysis by presenting a mapping of specific
service characteristics to optimal procurement elements. We conclude with a detailed proposal
for services of the particular example of cataract surgery.  
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3METHODS OF PROCUREMENT 
Methods of procurement come in a number of generic forms, many of which apply to health
care. There are however, several features particular to health care finance and delivery, which
we consider later in the paper.
One of the most commonly used procurement methods is posted prices, whereby the buyer
announces a price and the first supplier willing to sell at that price closes the transaction (see,
for example, Milgrom 1989; Rothkopf and Harstad 1994). Posted prices are widely used in
transactions of inexpensive and standardized items. For commodity products, such as gold,
electricity, or memory chips, this price can be the “spot price” if a spot market exists. 
Another procurement method is cost-based pricing, which allows the supplier to set the
transaction price based on the supplier’s cost. In this method, the supplier is paid a fraction of
its cost (often 100%) plus a fee to allow for a profit (see Laffont and Tirole 1994). Cost-based
pricing is commonly used in regulated industries such as utilities as a way to limit the profits
of “natural monopolies” (this is sometimes called “rate-of-return regulation”).
Sole-sourced contracts with a single supplier (or a set of suppliers) are often used for non-
standard products that are to be purchased over a long period of time. In this method, price is
determined through bilateral negotiations for a period of time that is specified in the contract.
Such contracts are often written to assure that neither party exploits the relationship-specific
investments that are often inherent in the production of non-standard products. One major
limitation of this method — whenever the sales person is not the owner — is that contracts
give the procurement agent an opportunity to take kickbacks from the supplier or otherwise act
in ways that do not coincide with the interests of the purchaser.
Competitive bidding (or auction), on the other hand, is more transparent and less vulnerable to
behind-the-scene agreements. When goods are standardized, competitive bidding can generate
prices that would prevail in a competitive market — that is, prices approximate average costs,
with minimal economic profits for sellers (see Laffont and Tirole 1994, chap. 7). Competitive
bidding can also work well when goods are not standardized or when market prices are highly
unstable (see Milgrom 1989; Wang 1993). For example, the purchaser can submit a request for
proposals that specifies exact bid requirements, thereby standardizing what would otherwise be
differentiated products. Alternatively, the seller could score each point of differentiation on a
numeric scale, effectively converting the characteristics of each product into a single number.
This again facilitates simple comparisons across bids in a way that promotes competition. One
common bidding structure is the “second-price” auction, in which the lowest bidder wins the
contract but is paid the bid price of the second-lowest bidder. Second-price auctions encourage
bidders to reveal truthfully through their bids their costs of production. 1 The mechanism can be
modified to an “Nth price” auction in which there are N – 1 winners, each paid the Nth-lowest
bid price. We exploit this property in our proposal for procuring cataract surgery.
1 For a general summary of this and other auction forms, see Milgrom (1989).
4Relational contracting involves less formal contracting mechanisms that rely on both
quantitative and qualitative information that is often shaped by experience. Contracting that
begins with one of the more formal mechanisms listed above may transform into relational
contracting over time. This is especially likely if there are substantial advantages to the
incumbent supplier in subsequent rounds of contracting, perhaps as a result of sunk
investments in specific assets.2 As such advantages mount, this could turn what had been a
competitive procurement market into one with, effectively, a single dominant seller.3 In such a
case, maximizing static efficiency (selecting a single supplier and realizing efficiencies from
sunk investment in specific assets) might come at the expense of long-run efficiency (which
might be reduced when alternative suppliers become unviable). In procurement auctions with
multiple suppliers and auctions that are repeated at relatively short intervals (say, annually),
winning in the current period is less likely to entrench the winning bidders and, similarly,
losing in a given round is less likely to render losing bidders unviable. 
ASSESSING PROCUREMENT METHODS 
In assessing their potential strengths and weaknesses, we compare the various procurement
methods along two sets of dimensions: their contribution to the ultimate goal of procurement
— a fair process that generates low costs and high quality — and the characteristics of the
production and procurement process. 
Costs and Quality 
A primary goal of procurement is to obtain the highest-quality product or service at the lowest
price. The posted-price method might be sufficient when goods are standardized and a
benchmark price exists (as in the case of commodities sold in open markets).4 In other
settings, it might be important for the buyer to use competitive bidding to get the best deal.
Cost-based pricing, however, is thought to be particularly ineffective at promoting competition,
and is usually restricted to regulated monopolies such as utilities. Indeed, it is widely held that
the so-called medical arms race in which U.S. hospitals competed for doctors and patients by
adding costly duplicative technology resulted from cost-plus pricing for hospitals (see
Robinson and Luft 1985). The reason for the poor performance of cost-based contracts is that
they generate higher returns for less efficient firms and so actually discourage efficiency. 
2 Specific assets are assets that have higher value when used in conjunction with a particular transaction but less value
when deployed elsewhere. Firms that make sunk investments in specific assets obtain greater value by continuing
their ongoing relationship than by turning back to the market. See, generally, Williamson (1971); Klein, Crawford,
and Alchian (1978); and Riordan and Williamson (1985). See specific applications in Monteverde and Teece (1982);
Muris, Scheffman, and Spiller (1992); and Shephard (1993).
3 Williamson (1976) identifies this as one of the “dynamic costs” of procurement via repeated auctions.
4 In this case, the posted-price method performs better than those such as competitive bidding, where it might be costly
to announce bidding rules and to request and score proposals.
5Fairness 
It is important in public procurement to treat potential suppliers with fairness. It is especially
important to establish objective procurement criteria when the buying agent cannot be
completely trusted (see Rothkopf and Harstad 1994). On this dimension, competitive bidding
scores high because it treats potential suppliers treated equally and because the bidding process
reduces the discretion of the buying agent. Often, however, the winning supplier obtains an
advantage that effectively eliminates competition in later rounds of bidding. Subsequent
procurement then relies on relational contracting, and the buyer and supplier end up
negotiating over the terms of the contract and the division of the rents. To the extent that such
negotiations involve information that is not readily available to taxpayers, this outcome could
facilitate favouritism or corruption.5
In some cases, “fairness” is taken to imply that suppliers do not earn “excess” profits, however
they might be defined. If fairness, so-defined, is the priority, cost-based pricing might be
desirable. If fairness means that the purchaser has paid no more for the product than other
purchasers have, then posted prices based on other observed transactions might be preferred.
Fairness, however, generally does not equate to efficiency.
Product Differentiation 
Buyers frequently prefer certain suppliers based on location, reputation, or other points of
differentiation.6 It is sometimes possible to score non-price dimensions and continue to use
competitive bidding (see Fox 1974; Che 1993), but this method is often not practical as there
could be too many dimensions to score properly. Moreover, critical dimensions can be hard to
measure, and scoring only those dimensions that are readily measurable might lead to giving
them more weight in choosing a supplier, an especially problematic issue when fairness is a
concern. 
In short, all procurement methods have pros and cons when the product is differentiated, and
no single method stands out. In posted prices and contracts, it is usually at the purchasing
agent’s discretion to ascertain the dollar value of the difference in non-price attributes. Hence,
in such cases, the agent’s trustworthiness is crucial.
5 See Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin (2006); Lambert-Mogiliansky and Kosenok (2009); and Hyytinen, Lundberg,
and Toivanen (2007).
6 The following quote from a former IBM purchasing officer confirms this: “There is nothing that a company buys that
I can think of where only the price is important. There is a price, quality, delivering, and technology issue in
everything. So the purest use of auctions where the lowest bidder gets the business no matter what is terrible” (ISM
2002).
6Cost Uncertainty  
It is often difficult — with respect to high-technology projects with research and development
costs, for example — for the supplier to predict the final cost of production at the time of
procurement. In such cases, since cost-based pricing eliminates the risk of unforeseen costs for
the supplier, this method is often used to guarantee the supplier a profit. Posted prices, in
contrast, are risky for the supplier due to cost uncertainty, and are not preferred in such
procurements (see Laffont and Tirole 1994). Competitive bidding also might not work well
whenever there is uncertainty about the final cost of production: the supplier with the best offer
might tend to underestimate, and so to underprice, the true cost of production — an example of
the so-called winner’s curse (see Milgrom and Weber 1982). This drawback of competitive
bidding might be of concern to the purchaser if the long-term viability of suppliers is an
important strategic objective.
Asymmetric Information 
In procuring non-standardized products, the buyer cannot be completely informed about the
supplier’s cost. For instance, a provincial transportation department would not know the
supplier’s cost of materials for highway construction. In such cases, cost-based pricing
provides the supplier with little incentive to be cost efficient. Even worse, the supplier might
inflate reported costs to increase the payment from the buyer. Posted prices, in contrast, avoid
this problem because suppliers have to minimize their cost to obtain maximal gains. At the
same time, if quality cannot be measured easily, posted prices might force suppliers to reduce
the quality of their product in order to lower cost (see Laffont and Tirole 1994).
Repeat Purchases  
Buyers that often purchase the same goods with regular frequency typically enter into contracts
with suppliers to build long-term relationships. Among the advantages of long-term contracts
are that they
• insure both parties against price fluctuations;
• facilitate relationship-specific investments;
• provide an incentive for the supplier to become more efficient in production (this matters
especially if the product is not standardized); and
• enable parties to better manage each other’s needs, strengths, and work styles through
frequent contract renegotiation (see Laffont and Tirole 1988; Hirao 1993).
Methods that are commonly used for one-time purchases, on the other hand, typically lack
these advantages. 
If competitive bidding is used for a good or service that will be purchased in the future and
there are sunk investments or a learning curve, then the supplier with a winning offer is likely
to have a considerable advantage during subsequent purchase decisions (this is sometimes
referred to as “lock in”). This advantage effectively could make the winner a monopolist,
ultimately resulting in bilateral negotiations between the buyer and the winner instead of
competitive bidding for future repeated purchases.7
If the purchaser is a monopsonist — that is, it is a dominant purchaser of the good or service in
question — it might be difficult to compel suppliers to make relationship-specific investments
that would have little value outside the trading relationship. The reason is that, after making
these investments, the buyer could “hold up” the sellers in future contract periods by refusing
to pay prices that cover the sunk costs of the investments (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978),
while the sellers would have little choice but to go along. In this case, it is critical that the
purchaser establish a reputation for paying fair prices that cover all reasonable costs, including
sunk costs, or else vendors will refuse to make efficient investments.
WHAT MAKES HEALTH CARE DIFFERENT?  
Because most theoretical models of procurement were developed with applications such as
military equipment in mind, they do not account for several crucial characteristics of health
care services. In order to understand why “health care is different,” it is helpful to briefly
describe the health care value chain. 
Typically, a patient’s first encounter with health care services is with a primary care physician
or other provider of primary care, who is sometimes referred to as the “gatekeeper.” The
physician makes an initial diagnosis and is often able to recommend a treatment that will
resolve the problem. If the problem requires specialized care, the gatekeeper will refer the
patient to a specialist physician who will further diagnose the ailment. The specialist may then
recommend that the patient receive treatment at a hospital or other advanced care facility such
as an ambulatory surgery centre. Subsequent to treatment, the patient may require therapy or
other follow-up services. If the condition is chronic, the patient may require additional
treatments. 
Even in this highly stylized example, we see a number of ways in which health care services
differ from the goods and services in generic models of procurement.8
7 Investing today for a rent tomorrow is a well-known and well-studied phenomenon in economics. For an application
in patent races, see Tirole (1995). Firms that procure rather than self-produce important inputs that feature such “lock
in,” often “second source” — that is, purchase some inputs from a potentially less efficient source — in order to
avoid this problem.
8 We do not mean to suggest that all of the characteristics described here are unique to health care, but they are
especially relevant to health care and often missing in other procurement situations.
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The Purchaser Does Not Dictate the Quantity   
In a typical procurement situation, the purchaser knows the value of the good in question and is
able to determine how much of the good it wants to purchase at any given price — as an
economist would put it, the purchaser knows the demand curve. This is not the case in health
care, however, for two reasons. First, the unpredictability of the incidence of ill health means
that the purchaser (that is, the provincial government) cannot know in advance how many hip
replacements, say, or cataract surgeries the population will require. The purchaser could limit
the number of surgeries it is prepared to purchase, but this necessarily entails the risk that
incidence will exceed the limit. Rationing would result. 
Second, information is asymmetric in the sense that sellers (that is, the physicians) have better
information than the purchaser does about the value of health care services. It is extremely
difficult for a government to know whether a particular patient requires a hip replacement or
which hip prosthesis is optimal — indeed, patients themselves are hard pressed to know their
own medical needs, which is why they delegate authority to primary care physicians. In
complex cases, these physicians in turn must rely on specialists. This asymmetry of
information between health care purchasers and providers creates the potential for conflicts of
interest. Since health care providers not only diagnose ailments but also prescribe and perform
treatments, they can influence the quantity of care they deliver and may alter quantity in
response to financial incentives. For example, if sellers are paid on a fee-for-service basis
where the fees exceed their marginal costs of production, they might recommend tests and
procedures of questionable value. This is known as the problem of “supplier-induced demand”
(see Evans 1974). While this may be of minor concern when the service being induced is, say,
a follow-up visit for a patient with a minor ailment, it can be a major concern if the service is
an MRI or surgery. Health services researchers have found unambiguous evidence that patients
receive more medical services, at a higher cost, when providers are paid on a fee-for-service
basis as opposed to a fixed salary or similar arrangement that separates compensation from
service intensity (see, for example, McGuire 2000). The evidence is ambiguous, however, on
whether suppliers induce demand to make up for lost income after, say, a reduction in payment
rates or an increase in competition.
It Is Difficult to Specify the “Product” with Precision  
In a typical procurement situation, the purchaser specifies the characteristics of the product,
and suppliers compete to sell the specified product. In the case of health care services,
however, the characteristics of the product are difficult to specify in advance and, more
important, can vary substantially from one patient to the next. 
Consider hip replacement surgery. Although this seems like a well-defined product, there is, in
fact, considerable variation in the surgery process from one patient to the next. Due to
idiosyncratic differences among patients, two patients requiring hip replacement surgery might
need very different surgery and recovery times, choices of prosthetic hip, medications, physical
and occupational therapy, and so forth, leading to very different costs for the two hip
replacements. Moreover, it would be impractical, if not impossible, to try to specify, via
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9contract, how each patient should be treated. Simply put, “sicker” patients are more costly to
treat, and it is difficult for the payer reliably to discern sicker patients from more routine
patients and to contract for the appropriate care for each patient.
Another important implication of patient heterogeneity, given that some providers are more
skilled than others, is the desire to sort difficult cases from easier ones. Ideally, the procurement
system should encourage the most skilled providers to handle the most difficult cases.
Quality Is Difficult to Monitor  
In a typical procurement situation, it is usually possible for the purchaser to measure quality,
either at the time of purchase or after the fact, and warrantees could even be included in the
contract. Health care quality, in contrast, is exceptionally difficult to evaluate. Patients might
be unable to determine whether they have received adequate care. Purchasers could attempt to
measure quality using a range of potential outcome measures, but only some measures are
found in existing data systems and any outcomes would have to be severity adjusted.
Moreover, because of the complexity of the value chain, including the important role of patient
health behaviours, it is often difficult to ascribe blame for poor outcomes. Attaching financial
incentives to particular quality metrics also might have the undesirable consequence of
encouraging providers to treat patients or perform particular procedures because they are likely
to generate higher measured quality, even if these are not the optimal medical decisions. Such
incentives also might result in a reduction in unmeasured quality.
Patient Decisions Are Subject to Moral Hazard  
In most public procurement situations, the government purchases a good, such as defence, and
does not charge user fees. Health care services are private goods, however, and the decision to
consume health services ultimately falls on the individual patient. The RAND National Health
Insurance Experiment found that patients who receive free health care consume substantially
more health services than those who make co-payments, yet, with few exceptions (primarily,
diabetes management), they do not appear to enjoy better health outcomes (see Newhouse et al.
1996). The availability of free care (that is, insured care), however, can contribute to the
phenomenon known as “moral hazard,” which can arise in two ways. First, the presence of
insurance might lead individuals to behave in ways that increase the risk that an adverse health
event will occur. Second, insured individuals might increase their consumption of medical
services, conditioned on an adverse health event’s occurring. It is generally believed that moral
hazard in health care is primarily of the second variety (see Pauly 1968); it seems unlikely that
individuals who have insurance coverage for cataract surgery, for example, would engage in
activities that would increase the need for surgery, but they might be more willing to undergo
the surgery if someone else is paying.9 Insurance also discourages patients from taking an
active role in monitoring the efficiency of their physician-agents: if patients are not responsible
for most of the costs of care, they do not act as a check on demand inducement.
9 There is, in fact, surprisingly little research on the extent of moral hazard and health behaviour.
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METHODS OF PROCUREMENT TAILORED TO HEALTH CARE  
How do the defining features of the health care process affect the procurement process? In this
section, we consider alternative payment mechanisms.
Fee-for-Service Payment 
Traditionally, health care services have been purchased on a fee-for-service basis. This has two
distinct advantages: physicians are compensated for all necessary effort, and those who treat
sicker patients receive higher reimbursement. This method also has several important
disadvantages. First, fee-for-service payment encourages overuse of health care service by
inducing increased demand. Second, insurance allow providers to increase prices well above
costs without fear of losing business. High profit margins, in turn, encourage entry that further
drives up costs. Therefore, payers (that is, governments) often do not allow providers to set
their own prices but instead impose or negotiate fee schedules. Third, fee-for-service payment
does little to assure quality — if anything, it mutes incentives for quality because providers are
paid to fix the problems that arise from poor care delivery. 
Cost-based Reimbursement 
Beginning in the 1950s, Blue Cross plans in the United States began to reimburse hospitals on
a cost basis, mimicking a strategy often used in utility regulation. Other insurers followed suit
— Alberta Health Services, for example, currently reimburses orthopaedic surgery providers on
that basis. Yet cost-based reimbursement in health care has all the familiar problems of cost-
based reimbursement in traditional procurement, including arbitrary allocation of certain fixed
or overhead components of cost. Moreover, to the extent that payments exceed variable costs,
the reimbursement approach induces increased demand for services. Finally, cost-based
reimbursement ensures the survival of the least efficient producers and encourages producers to
compete by offering expensive new technologies, regardless of whether demand exists to use
them efficiently. Health economists thus criticize cost-based reimbursement as a strategy that
drives cost inflation (see Dranove 2001).
Prospective Payment  
As an alternative to cost-based reimbursement, payers have adopted a variety of methods
loosely described as “prospective payment.” In 1970, the state of New York began paying
hospitals a fixed fee for each inpatient day, and several other states quickly followed suit. In
1983, the U.S. federal government introduced its own prospective payment system for
Medicare, paying a fixed fee for each inpatient stay, with the fee varying according to the
patient’s condition, or diagnosis-related group (DRG). The fee was based on national cost
averages, thereby creating what Andrei Shleifer (1985) dubbed “yardstick competition.” In
principle, hospitals could prosper only by bringing their costs below the national average (the
yardstick). It was hoped that, by competing in this way, hospitals would invest in ways to
become more efficient, reducing costs to their most efficient levels. Yardstick competition in
the Medicare program did lower inpatient hospital costs, but not entirely by improving
efficiency. To varying degrees, hospitals substituted outpatient and home care for inpatient
care, so that patients were discharged “quicker but sicker.” Hospitals also manipulated
diagnostic coding so as to place patients in more remunerative DRGs.10 Due to high variation
in patients’ medical needs within DRGs, some hospitals might have turned away sicker patients
whose costs were expected to exceed the reimbursement.
The success of prospective payment clearly depends on the balance among
• variation in hospital efficiency;
• the ability of hospitals to increase efficiency in response to financial incentives;
• whether there are substitutes in the production process not captured by the prospective
payment;
• whether it is costly to monitor and punish substitution done solely to increase profits; and
• the ability to precisely define the relevant service categories.
The U.S. Medicare system has taken many steps to address the latter, most recently by
increasing the number of DRGs by more than half and, despite some “gaming” by providers
(for example, by manipulating diagnostic codes), the DRG-based system of prospective
payment is considered to be successful. Most private health insurers in the United States have
followed Medicare’s lead, reimbursing hospitals on either a per diem or a DRG basis.
Gatekeepers, Capitation, and Global Payments  
During the 1980s, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) in the United States grew
rapidly. Although not as popular as they once were, HMOs still hold about a 25 percent market
share. In a typical HMO, patients select primary care physicians to serve as their gatekeepers.
Primary care physicians provide all routine and preventive care, and patients cannot receive
specialist or hospital care without their gatekeepers’ approval. The HMO holds primary care
physicians financially accountable for their gatekeeping through various mechanisms,
including “capitation,” under which primary care physicians are paid a monthly fee for each
assigned patient (a “per member per month” fee), and are then financially responsible for a
predetermined set of services, such as office visits, diagnostic tests, prescription drugs, and
specialist referrals. Under “global capitation,” primary care physicians are financially
responsible for all medical expenses. However, this system places too much risk on primary
care physicians and creates a financial incentive for them to reduce care. After initial efforts in
the 1980s, the system was quickly abandoned. 
10 A number of studies have documented “upcoding” under Medicare’s prospective payment system; see, for example,
Carter, Newhouse, and Relles (1990); Silverman and Skinner (2004); and Dafny (2005).
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The benefit of capitation is that the primary care physician has an incentive both to keep
patients healthy and to monitor the costs of services covered under the capitation agreement.
Capitation also has several limitations. One is that there is a necessary tradeoff between
comprehensiveness of service coverage and the risk that primary care physicians must bear.
Because the capitation agreement does not usually cover all services, primary care physicians
have an incentive to substitute away from covered services and prescribe uncovered services
that are often more expensive. Perhaps the most difficult problem facing primary care
physicians under capitation, however, is that they lack the information to identify the most
cost-effective specialists and the ability to change specialists’ behaviour. 
One way to increase the inclusiveness of services covered under capitation is to increase the
range of providers covered by the capitation agreement. During the late 1980s, U.S. hospitals
created physician/hospital organizations (PHOs) — financial partnerships between hospitals
and some of their medical staff, including primary care physicians and specialists. PHOs
accepted global capitation from insurers, but, although they could bear the financial risk more
easily, they faced the same basic problem as did primary care physicians in that they had an
incentive to shift care to providers, such as long-term care facilities, that were not included in
the PHO and, more important, they could not readily identify and incentivize cost-effective
physicians. 
The 1990s saw the emergence of integrated delivery systems (IDSs) in which hospitals,
physician groups, and other modes of care are placed under a single umbrella. IDSs also accept
global capitation but, like primary care physicians and PHOs, have had difficulty delivering
cost-effective care. 
Gatekeeper primary care physicians, PHOs, and IDSs share one additional shortcoming. By
accepting capitation and the financial risk associated with their patients’ medical costs, they
essentially take on the role of insurance companies, but they lack the medical underwriting
capability required to price their services appropriately — indeed, many IDSs suffered
significant losses in the late 1990s when they aggressively pursued prepaid contracts without
adequate medical underwriting.
A variant of capitation is “episode of illness payment.” Here, the payer defines an episode of
illness and pays a fee that is supposed to cover all treatment during the episode. In addition to
the obvious problem of defining the onset and end of the episode, however, this variant suffers
from the familiar difficulty of providing the right information and incentives within the
organization that receives the payment. 
A SPECIAL WORD ABOUT GATEKEEPERS  
Gatekeepers are third-party intermediaries who mediate the patient’s relationship with specialty
providers. In a sense, purchasers are themselves gatekeepers. They can steer patients to
specialists and decide which services are justified. Insurers in the United States do this to some
extent when they assemble networks of providers and determine the structure of benefits. This
raises a two-part question: can physicians do the job better than purchasers, and how can the
incentives of the two be aligned?
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In general, purchasers have expertise in administering benefits and paying claims. It would be
impossible, or at least extremely costly, for purchasers also to gain and deploy medical
expertise on a patient-by-patient and even episode-by-episode basis. The specialist who treats a
given patient is likely to know whether that patient’s illness is complex, but will has a strong
financial incentive to categorize cases as complex, whether they are or not, especially if the
cost of services required to justify the complex diagnosis is not too great. The gatekeeper’s role
in this setting is to determine, on behalf of the purchaser, whether or not the patient’s illness is
complex. The requisite expertise from a gatekeeper is thus medical, rather than financial. Is a
visit to a specialist necessary? If so, what specialist? Is the specialist’s proposed course of
treatment medically appropriate and consistent with the purchaser’s objectives and obligations?
Building this expertise is not the key challenge for the purchaser, however; rather, it is to
construct financial incentives that induce the gatekeeper to apply that expertise consistent with
the purchaser’s objectives. To that end, a number of issues need to be considered.
• When the total number of procedures is set, the gatekeeper might be required to perform
triage; otherwise, each provider will want to perform more procedures on their patients,
leaving fewer procedures available for patients of other providers. 
• In principle, one could pay the gatekeeper a flat salary, as this would generate no incentive
to either induce demand or undertreat the patient. However, the purchaser would have to be
mindful of the type of doctor who would accept such employment and whether such a
doctor would be a good gatekeeper. 
• A gatekeeper who is paid a flat salary also has little financial incentive to do a good job.
But tying financial incentives to the gatekeeper’s performance might invite undesirable
gaming behaviour. 
• When gatekeepers perform triage, they necessarily conflict with specialists who provide
treatment: will gatekeepers have the right information or the ability to gain the right
information, to determine what is medically appropriate? This might be a minor concern for
some procedures, but when diagnosis is complex and there are several treatment options,
gatekeepers might be hard pressed to make the right decisions. 
Pay-for-Performance  
In the past several decades, payers and providers alike have become acutely aware that the
quality of care is often inadequate and that existing payment systems do little to promote it —
and, by capping reimbursement, might actually impede quality improvement (see Brook 1991;
Brook, McGlynn, and Shekelle 2000). Health care report cards attempt to address this problem
by identifying the best and worst providers and letting market forces run their course, but
report cards have several shortcomings, and most insurers now provide at least some direct
financial incentives to improve quality through pay-for-performance programs. Such programs
are limited, however, by several factors. For one, insurers thus far have committed only a small
percent of reimbursement, usually 5-to-10%, to pay-for-performance. For another, insurers can
pay only for what they can objectively measure, and they usually limit themselves to a small
number of measures, which can be an incentive for providers to shirk on unmeasured aspects
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of care (see, for example, Mullen, Frank, and Rosenthal 2009). Moreover, notably absent from
pay-for-performance are key outcome measures. There are effectively no warrantees in health
care: providers are not on the hook to deliver a particular outcome or to refund payments if this
outcome is not achieved. This is due partly to difficulties in defining outcomes and identifying
who is responsible for a shortcoming; partly to a lack of innovation by health care payers; and
partly to a cultural reverence for physicians and the services they provide. 
One promising approach that combines elements of a warrantee with global capitation features
a prospective rate for a surgical intervention that includes a reasonable amount for treatment of
surgical complications.11 In other words, the surgeon is paid a fixed fee and is responsible for
the costs of any subsequent care associated with complications from the original surgery. The
add-on fee could be based on the complication rates of superior-quality providers as well as
indicators of patients’ risk factors. This warrantee would force all providers to internalize the
costs of complications, reward surgeons with low complication rates, and discourage low-
quality providers from performing risky procedures
Patient Cost-sharing  
The RAND National Health Insurance Experiment demonstrated that, in the United States,
spending on patients who received free health care was about 30 percent higher than that on
patients who made substantial out-of-pocket payments, yet the patients with free care fared
little better on a variety of health status indicators. This finding immediately led to a ratcheting
up of co-payments and deductibles. In the past few years, in an effort to limit moral hazard,
insurance plans known as consumer-directed health plans have featured substantial deductibles
of $2,000 or more. It is well known that cost sharing is more effective when demand is elastic
— that is, when consumers are very sensitive to price — as is more likely to be the case for
non-emergency and, especially, elective procedures. Insurers, however, have given less
consideration to the fact that the severely ill patients who account for the bulk of health care
spending quickly exhaust their deductibles, which suggests that consumer-directed health plans
will have limited effectiveness.12
11 This idea was developed by Dr. Michael Pine, a pioneer in the report card movement.
12 In the United States, health care spending is highly concentrated, with just 5% of the population accounting for
nearly half of all health care expenditures and 20% of the population accounting for 80% of spending (see Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation, “Kaiser Slides”; accessed online at http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?ch=822). The vast
majority of this spending is minimally affected by cost sharing even under high deductible plans — these patients
almost surely will pay their deductibles and exceed their out-of-pocket maximums and ultimately face a very low
marginal payment for health care.
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIFFERENT PAYMENT RULES 
There has been considerable research on health care payment strategies. In this section, we
summarize this literature.
Pay-for-Performance  
While pay-for-performance has been widely discussed in recent years, there is as yet no clear
consensus on the efficacy of such programs, much less on what the characteristics of an
effective program might be. For example, in a comprehensive report, Sorbero et al. (2006)
summarize 15 peer-reviewed publications on pay-for-performance programs but cannot find a
systematic relationship between features of such plans and the efficacy of pay-for-performance.
Additionally, most of these 15 programs were not similar to current pay-for-performance
programs: typically, the programs reviewed in the report were smaller, of very short duration,
and offered relatively small rewards for performance. The authors also informally evaluate a
number of ongoing private programs by holding discussions with participants, but find no
consensus on the best way to design a pay-for-performance program due, in part, to differences
in the goals of individual sponsors, types of insurance products, and how health care providers
were organized within a geographic market.
More recent research also shows that more questions than answers exist about the efficacy of
pay-for performance. For example, in a study of two years of data on California’s pay-for-
performance program, Robinson, Williams, and Yanagihara report that “the requisite claims
data often are incomplete or poorly coded and that even large physician groups have too few
patients experiencing most types of episodes to permit statistically valid measurement for
public reporting and incentive payment” (2009). Further, Epstein (2007), Lindenauer et al.
(2007), and Young et al. (2007) all report very modest effects on quality of various pay-for-
performance programs, while the Institute of Medicine notes that “[m]ore than 100 reward and
incentive payment programs have been launched in the private health care sector. Most of these
efforts have not yet been fully evaluated” (2007).
In 2005, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) began a number of pay-for-
performance demonstration projects in the United States. In April 2009, the CMS reported a
seventeen percentage point improvement in quality among hospitals participating in its
Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration program and smaller but positive improvements
among participants in its Physician Group Practice demonstration (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services 2009). While these results are promising, participation in these studies is
voluntary, at least one study questions the validity of CMS’s metrics (Bhattacharyya et al.
2009), and, in September 2009, the CMS extended the demonstration program to “test the
effectiveness of new incentive models” (Premier Inc. 2009).
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Global Payments  
For reasons described above, true global capitation, in which primary care physicians receive a
set monthly fee per each patient under their care and are responsible for all medical expenses
of their patients, is now very rare. There is, however, a spectrum of arrangements ranging from
global capitation to pure fee-for-service reimbursement. The available evidence indicates that
moving in the direction of global payments does provide strong incentives to reduce the use of
health care services. 
For example, Cromwell, Dayhoff, and Thumaian (1997) analyze the effects on U.S. Medicare
spending and hospitals’ costs of the Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center
Demonstration, in which hospitals and physicians were paid a single negotiated global payment
for all inpatient care associated with heart bypass surgeries. They estimate that the
demonstration led to the equivalent of a 14% discount relative to projected Medicare
expenditures. During the demonstration, each of the four hospitals in the survey shortened its
average length of stay, and in three of the hospitals, average total costs fell in absolute terms by
2.0% to 23.4%. The authors attribute some of the savings to improvements in physician
practice patterns and patient protocols. They further report that all of the savings were achieved
with no reduction in quality, as measured by mortality rates of participants.
Prospective Payment  
Under prospective payment, reimbursement is based on the clinical status of the patient at the
time that care begins, rather than on the services actually rendered. The introduction in the
early 1980s of prospective payment into the U.S. Medicare system for inpatient care is widely
believed to have led to a reduction in the inpatient component of Medicare spending. White
(2008, 794) reports that “[t]he annual rate of excess growth [growth beyond that attributable to
general economic growth and changes in beneficiaries’ age composition] fell from 5.6 percent
during 1975-1983, to 2.1 percent during 1983-1997, to only 0.5 percent during 1997-2005.” He
concludes that the introduction of prospective payment is the most likely explanation for the
reduction in Medicare spending growth that began in 1983.
Murray (2009) provides an overview of Maryland’s all-payer hospital payment system, which
is similar to Medicare’s hospital prospective payment system but with some unique features.13
Under that system, the cost of a hospital admission in that state went from 26% above the
national average in 1976 to 2% below the national average in 2007. During this period,
Maryland experienced the second-lowest rate of cost increase per admission of any state and
consistently had the lowest markup of charges over cost. Nonetheless, while Maryland’s
prospective payment system has been effective at reducing costs per admission, the same does
not appear to have been true for hospital admissions or overall hospital volume. During the
2001-2007 period, admissions grew at an annual average rate of 2.7%, compared with an
average annual national rate of 1%.
13 Since 1971, health care costs in Maryland have been regulated by the Health Services Cost Review Commission,
which establishes service-specific rates for all inpatient, hospital-based outpatient, and emergency services at
hospitals in the state.
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Capitation and Fee-for-Service  
Gaynor and Mark (2002) survey empirical studies of the impact of contractual arrangements
between a physician and an insurer on health care use and find that capitation tends to decrease
use, while fee-for-service arrangements tend to increase it. Among the studies they survey,
Hillman, Pauly, and Kerstein (1989) find that patients in HMOs that paid primary care
physicians on a capitation basis had lower rates of hospitalization than did patients in HMOs
with a fee-for-service system. In another study, Murray et al. (1992) look at the number of tests
and total charges over a 12-month period for 165 patients who were diagnosed as hypertensive
and treated at two primary care outpatient clinics in the United States. They find that
physicians ordered one-third fewer tests for capitation patients than for fee-for-service patients,
while the total charges for medical care for capitation patients were half the total charges for
fee-for-service patients. In a third study in the Gaynor and Mark survey, Ferrall, Gregory, and
Tholl (1998) analyze the labour supply of Canadian physicians and find that fee-for-service
payment arrangements lead physicians to spend 11 more hours per week seeing patients and 1-
to-2 more total hours worked per week. 
Dusheiko et al. (2006) examine the effect of giving primary care physicians in England a
budget to purchase certain types of elective secondary care procedures for their patients,
charging them for care their patients receive, and allowing them to keep the surplus — a
scheme known as “fundholding,” essentially a form of capitation system. The authors find that
the abolition of fundholding increased ex-fundholders’ admission rates for elective secondary
care procedures by 3.5-to-5.1%.
Glazier et al. (2009) evaluate patterns of medical care under two reimbursement models — a
capitation model (adjusted for age and sex) and an enhanced fee-for-service model — that
were introduced as part of the reform of primary care in Ontario in the 2001-2003 period. Their
analysis shows that the two models were comparable in terms of both physician and patient
demographic characteristics and continuity of care, but capitation practices had fewer sick
patients, provided less after-hours care, had higher rates of use of emergency department
services, and enrolled fewer new patients. Exemptions from evening and weekend clinics for
groups providing hospital-based services might have contributed to reduced after-hours care
and higher rates of emergency department visits.
OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES  
Our review of procurement theory and evidence suggests that optimal procurement strategies
depend on the characteristics of the health care services being purchased. In this section, we
pull this information together to provide a mapping from specific characteristics of health care
services into specific procurement strategies. While we offer examples of services that possess
each characteristic, our judgment is best augmented with that of medical professionals. Our
findings are summarized in Table 1. Below, we elaborate on some of the characteristics
included in the table.
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Table 1. Mapping of Health Service Characteristics and Optimal Procurement Elements
(Y = Procurement method is appropriate for this feature; N = inappropriate)
*    Assumes that the total volume across all providers is determined by the procuring agent.
** If co-payment can be lower for higher-quality procedures, this might be optimal.
High “Induceability”  
It might be easier for physicians to induce demand for some services (for example, cataract
repair) or to influence patients to select more costly options (such as the choice of hip implant).
To the extent that fees exceed incremental costs, fee-for-service reimbursement should be
avoided because the positive margins create a strong financial incentive for physicians to
provide more care than is medically necessary. For the same reason, cost-based reimbursement
is also likely to be susceptible to inducement because payments usually are based on total
allocated costs, which typically exceed incremental costs by a substantial amount. 
There are several ways to sever the incentive to induce demand. One way is for the purchaser
to require third-party review. Another way is for a gatekeeper to play several roles, by selecting
the surgical provider based on previous information about practice patterns or by having “veto
power” over the procedure. This, however, requires putting in place well-structured incentives
for gatekeepers — in effect, such incentives are a substitute for more complete information on
the part of the payer. Finally, surgical providers could be paid on a capitation basis, although it
might be difficult to assign a specific population to each surgeon for the purposes of computing
the capitation payment. 
High induceability Y N Y* N
High incentive to select Y Y N N Y
healthy patients
Efficiency varies N Y Y N
Quality varies Y**
High fixed costs Y
Outcome easy to Y Y Y
measure / ensure
High elasticity of demand Y N Y Y Y
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As an alternative to severing inducement incentives, the purchaser could limit the number of
procedures it will pay for, thereby forcing providers to perform triage. For this latter approach
to function reasonably well, one of two conditions must hold: (i) all patients must, in
expectation, have roughly equal profitability (in which case, it might be reasonable to presume
that physicians would ignore financial considerations and simply triage on the basis of medical
need); or (ii) the profitability of patients must be roughly proportional to their medical need (in
which case, triage on the basis of profitability and on the basis of medical need are equivalent).
Under either scenario, the policy challenge is to identify the appropriate total number of
procedures, which involves identifying the point at which the marginal benefit of an additional
procedure is below the marginal cost of producing that procedure. 
Any method that relies on triage must address the allocation of patients and timing. To
illustrate these issues, suppose the payer wishes to limit the number of procedures to 3,000 per
year. This raises several interesting questions. Should the cap be subdivided among all eligible
providers — say, 300 procedures annually for each of ten providers? Such a cap would restrict
patients’ choice of provider, but without it each provider would have an incentive to do as
many procedures as possible before the aggregate cap was reached. Another issue is that it is
unlikely that exactly 250 appropriate cases would be presented each month. If the triage
methodology allowed for more than 250 procedures in the early months, it might be difficult
for the payer to refuse coverage if monthly demand for the procedure continued to exceed 250
as the year went on. One possible solution would be to shorten the contract period to, say, one
month, so as to assure that all patients throughout the year had reasonable access to the service,
but this would imply that access for any one patient would be tied to overall incidence in the
population during that month.
High Variation in Patients’ Medical Needs 
Many payment models pay a fee for a particular procedure or diagnosis. Sometimes that
procedure is well defined and there is little variation in the underlying medical process —
vaccinations are a good example, cataract surgery might be another. In other cases, the patient’s
medical needs are less well defined — for example, caesarean section patients might have a
host of complicating conditions that affect the course of treatment and resulting medical costs.
Capitation can be problematic when there is high variation in patients’ needs because it
discourages providers from incurring all the costs necessary to treat their patients. Capitation
also might discourage some providers from treating the most severely ill patients, causing
some patients to be “dumped” on providers of last resort (see Dranove 1987). Fee-for-service
or cost-based reimbursement is more appropriate here, as the reimbursement rate is positively
correlated with patients’ needs. The problem, again, is that, if fee-for-service reimbursement
makes all patients profitable regardless of medical need, the result will be an inducement of
demand. A possible solution is to use gatekeepers if (1) they can better observe patient needs
than can the payer and (2) the payer can design a set of proper incentives for the gatekeeper. 
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Perhaps the best way to deal with high variation in medical needs while keeping the incentives
of a capitation system is to narrow the payment categories. The United States recently did this
when it increased the Medicare program’s number of DRGs from around 550 to around 900.
This approach is not always feasible, of course, and requires higher levels of documentation
and a greater administrative burden. In addition, research has shown that the availability of
multiple codes for the same diagnosis leads to “upcoding” into the code associated with the
higher reimbursement.14
Where the equipment or skill required to provide appropriate care varies across patients with
the same general condition (for example, if some patients who need hip replacement are
particularly complex to treat), an effective payment system should create an incentive for the
more skilled or capital-intensive providers to treat patients with complex needs. As patients
might not be able to assess their own complexity reliably, appropriate matching is facilitated by
payments that make it profitable for high-end providers to treat complex patients but
unprofitable for other providers to do so. One approach to ensuring that such patients are
profitable is, again, to again narrow the payment categories and attach higher payments to the
more complex categories. This might not ensure appropriate matching, however, so
gatekeepers could play an important role even under a narrower set of payment categories.
High Variation in Productive Efficiency  
Some sellers are more efficient than others, especially for complex cases and chronic care. For
their part, purchasers want to reward and encourage efficiency. Fee-for-service payment and,
especially, prospective payment and capitation reward efficiency, but cost-based reimbursement
does not — in fact, it can reward inefficiency. Here, however, gatekeepers are unlikely to be
good evaluators of efficiency. 
14 When the United States instituted prospective payment under the Medicare program, roughly 40% of the DRGs
belonged to a “pair” of codes that shared the same main diagnosis. Within each pair, the codes were distinguished by
age restrictions and the presence of complications. In 1988, the age restrictions were eliminated and the
reimbursement was raised for codes with complications. The rate of complications soared — in particular, in
diagnoses where the additional reimbursement for coding complications increased the most. See Dafny (2005).
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CASE STUDY: CATARACT SURGERY  
In this section, we undertake a case study of cataract surgery and discuss its unique features
that pertain to the procurement decision. Our findings are summarized in Table 2, which
corresponds to the dimensions included in Table 1. Based on this checklist, any method for
procuring cataract surgery must address the potential for overuse (through induceability and
high demand elasticity) but need not address measurement difficulties that can encourage
gaming or harm quality. Although cataracts can occur because of congenital conditions,
disease, or trauma, our discussion focuses on age-related cataracts — more than half of all
Americans ages 65 and older have cataracts.
Table 2. Key Characteristics of Cataract Surgery
Mapping Cataract Surgery to the Procedure Matrix  
Although several professional organizations and insurers have developed specific guidelines
for when cataract surgery is appropriate, the procedure is elective and its timing ultimately
subjective. Around the world, the number of procedures has been highly sensitive to
reimbursement practices. A 2004 report for the OECD finds widely varying rates of surgery
even among the wealthiest countries; for example, in 2001, there were 1,375 procedures per
100,000 population in Canada, compared with 656 in the United Kingdom and 511 in Denmark
(Siciliani and Hurst 2004).15 Alberta Health Services reports that, in Calgary, the total number
of procedures increased by 32% between fiscal years 2004/05 and 2006/07, reaching 10,306 in
that year; subsequently, a global cap was imposed of around 8,500 per year. 
Clearly, physicians are able to influence the rate of cataract surgery, which creates a high
potential for inducement of demand. It is also likely that patients will display a high elasticity
of demand given that vision impairment is neither painful nor life threatening. At the same
time, patients are likely to be sensitive to the quality, comfort, and cost of the procedure. 
15 According to OECD data, the shares of 2007 populations over age 65 were 16.0% (United Kingdom), 15.5%
(Denmark), 13.4% (Canada), and 12.6% (United States). Were Canada’s population not significantly younger than
that of the United Kingdom or Denmark, the disparity almost surely would be even more pronounced.
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High induceability ✓
High incentive to select healthy patients
Efficiency varies ✓
Quality varies
High fixed costs ✓
Outcome easy to measure ✓



















Compared to other medical services, pre- and post-operative vision quality is fairly
straightforward to measure, as are post-operative complications. Facility costs are mainly fixed,
and there might be significant differences in these costs across facilities. Variable costs consist
of supplies and the surgeon’s time. Costs vary little across patients, and complications are rare,
so that physicians have little incentive to “cream skim” the healthiest patients.
The Procurement of Cataract Surgeries in Alberta  
The current procurement mechanism in Alberta is characterized by a cap on the number of
procedures together with separate but fixed payments to facilities and surgeons. Caps and
payments are determined separately for Calgary and Edmonton. After the cap in each region is
exhausted for the year (typically in September), no additional procedures are funded.
Facilities submit bids to Alberta Health Services at regular intervals, and an evaluation
committee takes all bids and averages or blends them to determine the price. In all, providers
bid on 14 categories of ophthalmic procedures, with overall case volumes ranging from 0-749,
750-1,500 1,501-2,500, and 2,501 and over, with various prices per volume range. Unlike the
second-price auction, which encourages bidders to announce prices that correspond to their
production costs, this process does nothing to encourage either truthful bidding or low bidding.
There is an implied risk that Alberta Health Services might allocate more procedures to the
lowest bidder(s), but in fact this has never occurred. The process might even encourage
providers to inflate their bids to boost the average price.
Each surgeon maintains a waiting list, and the number of procedures the surgeon performs is
determined by the chief of the Division of Opthalmology of Alberta Health Services. The
allocation of procedures across facilities is accomplished through a combination of surgeon
affiliations, ownership interest (surgeons who have an ownership interest in a facility are
always permitted to perform procedures at that facility), and decisions by the chief of the
Division of Opthalmology. 
Currently, in Calgary, most cataracts are replaced in “non-hospital surgical facilities,” while, in
Edmonton, the vast majority (85%) are performed in hospitals. In Calgary, two of the five non-
hospital surgical facilities dominate the market, with shares of 36% and 27%, respectively. In
Edmonton, one inpatient facility alone performs 65% of the procedures.
RECOMMENDATIONS  
In this section, we compare Alberta’s current approach to the procurement of cataract
procedures with recommendations we would make to Alberta Health Services. Our
recommendations are guided by the distinct characteristics of cataract surgery, and we caution
these options might not be appropriate for other procurement cases. As noted above, cataract
surgery is characterized by minimal variation in the cost to treat any particular patient. The
outcomes are easily observable and complications are rare and straightforward to verify.
Perhaps the most dominant feature of the procedure is its susceptibility to demand inducement.
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Our proposal recognizes the importance of restraining cost growth while providing as many
procedures as the budget permits. After presenting our proposal, we offer several caveats and
possible modifications.
Step 1: Identification of Surgical Candidates  
Identification of surgical candidates should be performed by a licensed ophthalmologist (for a
fee to be determined by Alberta Health Services). The ophthalmologist should also prepare a
standardized report with the pertinent patient history to forward to the surgeon who is selected
to perform the procedure. Any candidate deemed appropriate for surgery should be entered into
a central government list, together with a categorization of urgency and the exam report.
The creation of a centralized waiting list, together with a categorization of urgency,
would enable Alberta Health Services to treat the most urgent cases first, while
minimizing the incentive for any surgeon to overstate the urgency of a given patient
in order to increase his or her own caseload. This system compares to the current
approach in which rationing is implicitly performed through time on the waiting list
(currently far above the stated goal of 16 weeks).
Step 2: Selection and Payment of Qualified Surgical Providers 
We propose two related alternatives for allocating patients to surgeons and determining
payments: an Nth-price sealed bid auction and a sealed bid schedule.
AN NTH-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
In an Nth-price sealed bid auction, each licensed surgeon who wishes to participate in the
program submits a bid price. This price is a global fee per cataract that includes all care related
to the lens replacement (including facility and supply costs), as well as any possible
complications that result (we elaborate on this under “quality warrantee” below). 
All surgeons who bid below the Nth-lowest bid would be eligible to perform cataract surgeries
during the contract period and would be paid the Nth-lowest bid. Alberta Health Services
would choose N to ensure that a sufficient number of providers fulfills expected demand
during the contract period. (This is akin to a second-price auction but recognizes the capacity
constraints of individual surgeons and the value that patients place on having a choice of
providers.)
After Alberta Health Services determines the eligible providers, each provider would be told
whether he or she is eligible and the amount of the reimbursement. For planning purposes,
eligible providers also would be informed of the number of total procedures approved for the
contract period, as well as the number of eligible providers. Each provider would have to agree
to serve all patients at any price greater than or equal to the bid.
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The recommended approach would bundle the payments of providers and facilities,
providing incentives to minimize total costs; currently, Alberta Health Services pays
each separately. In addition, the current facility-bidding mechanism, in which the
lowest bid determines the prevailing price that is offered to all facilities, provides
little incentive for facilities to make low bids. Finally, this mechanism would allow
Alberta Health Services to set a budget cap, rather than a procedure cap.
A SEALED BID SCHEDULE 
Under a sealed bid schedule, each licensed surgeon would submit a “schedule” specifying the
number of patients he or she would be willing to treat for any given price. The schedule might
be flat (that is, the same price for all patients), but it also might have “steps.” Prices should not
decrease at any point in the schedule. For example, a physician might submit a bid of $2,000
for the first 100 patients and $2,200 for any number of patients between 101 and 200, but the
physician could not submit a price below $2,000 for patients 101 through 200. Alberta Health
Services would aggregate the bid schedules by identifying the least-cost way of providing any
given total volume and select the price and quantity combination it desires. All surgeons would
be paid the same price for all procedures, which would be set equal to the amount of the
marginally excluded bid. If Alberta Health Services were to set a global budget for cataract
surgery, this mechanism would ensure the maximum number of procedures within that budget,
subject to the proviso that all providers would be paid uniformly. 
After Alberta Health Services has determined the eligible providers, providers would be told of
their eligibility and the reimbursement amount. For planning purposes, eligible providers also
would be informed of the maximum number of procedures they may perform during the
contract.
For example, suppose Alberta Health Services were to set a global budget of $1 million for the
contract period, and three physicians then submitted the following bid schedules: physician A,
$1,900 per procedure up to 600 procedures; physician B, $1,800 per procedure for the first 200
procedures and $2,000 for 500 additional procedures; and physician C, $2,200 per procedure
up to 300 procedures. The reimbursement would be set by the bid price for procedure number
N + 1, as follows. Two hundred procedures would be assigned to physician B (the lowest
bidder) at a price of $1,900 (the lowest excluded bid). If only 200 procedures were to be
financed, the total cost would equal $1,900 H 200 = $380,000.16 However, since the global
budget would exceed this amount, the allocation would proceed to offer some volume to
physician A (the second-lowest bidder). As a result of including physician A in the choice set,
the market price would rise to $2,000 per procedure. Given the global budget of $1 million,
this would allow Alberta Health Services to purchase 500 procedures — 300 from physician A
and 200 from physician B. Note that both physician A and physician B would receive the price
of $2,000. 
16 The price would be $1,900, rather than $1,800, because this is a second-price auction in which the market price is the
price of the marginal procedure. In this case, the lowest bid for the 201st procedure would be physician A’s bid of
$1,900.
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This example highlights the efficiency incentives inherent in second-price auctions: each
bidder realizes that its expected quantity is directly determined by its own bid, but the price it
receives is determined only by other bidders’ bids. Thus, bidders have no incentive to overbid
in order to increase margins should they win. By bidding truthfully — that is, by bidding the
lowest price at which it is willing to provide services — each bidder knows that it will sell all
of its services at prices greater than or equal to its bid. Because second-price auctions elicit
truthful bids, they also result in allocative efficiency: total quantity is maximized for any given
level of expenditure. 
This variant would ensure that the most efficient providers are allocated the highest
number of procedures. Currently, allocation is performed by the chief of the
Division of Opthalmology, and efficiency is not explicitly considered in the
allocation process.
Step 3: Matching of Patients and Providers 
AN NTH-PRICE SEALED BID AUCTION 
In an Nth-price sealed bid auction, a patient deemed eligible for surgery would receive a list of
surgeons eligible to perform surgery during the contract period. Patients would agree to contact
surgeons within a month of receiving clearance, and surgeons in turn would agree to provide
care within a month of the contact (although exact time periods would be determined by
Alberta Health Services).
Patients would have free choice of eligible providers, which implies that each provider might
perform more or less than the capped number of procedures divided by the total number of
eligible providers, although the sum of all procedures would equal the cap. This would inject
into the process a second level of competition — for patients among included providers — and
thereby create incentives to offer patients quality and convenience.
Currently, patients on the waiting list are affiliated with the surgeon who placed
them on the list, implying that the choice of surgeon must be made at the time of the
initial visit. The waiting time for each patient therefore depends on whether the
surgeon’s allocation has been exhausted — information that the patient is unlikely
to have.
A SEALED BID SCHEDULE 
Under a sealed bid schedule, the same mechanism would be employed to match patients and
physicians, but physicians would not be able to perform more than the number of procedures
they have been explicitly allocated.
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Step 4: Quality Warrantee 
As is customary, physicians would have routine post-surgical follow-up consultations with
patients, the cost of which would be included in the global fee. The physician also would be
responsible for all costs associated with surgical complications. As a result, the best-quality
physicians, measured in terms of having the fewest complications, likely would be the most
successful bidders. A patient who suffered complications should have the right to be treated by
a different physician if desired; in these cases, the associated reimbursements would be
determined by Alberta Health Services and paid by the original surgeon. 
Step 5: Additional Details and Optional Adjustments  
QUALITY BONUS
To incentivize high-quality service, Alberta Health Services might wish to implement a system
whereby physicians receive grades based on their complication rates (or an alternative,
physician-designed ratings system). Physicians with higher grades could receive a bonus per
procedure performed or their bids might be automatically lowered by the bonus amount (while
they would still always receive the clearing price plus the bonus amount). Alberta Health
Services might include other factors, such as patient survey results, waiting times, and
adherence to promised scheduling, in determining the quality bonus. In light of the, at best,
tentative state of knowledge of the efficacy of various forms of pay-for-performance, Alberta
Health Services might want to experiment over time or in different geographic areas with
alternative methods for incentivizing and rewarding quality.
Currently, Alberta Health Services pays additional supplements to facilities that
perform medical training. Our proposal would expand the set of supplements that
could be paid, while maintaining the incentives of the bidding system.
SUSTAINING COMPETITION  
We assume that bidders would not conspire to fix prices. As long as there were a substantial
number of potential bidders — say, five or more — price fixing would be unlikely. Even so,
the province should remind bidders about the antitrust laws and discourage mergers that would
combine significant numbers of existing providers.17
17 To encourage further competition among providers who might be in existing medical groups, Alberta Health Services
could allow each group member to submit secretly a personal bid. In this way, some, but not all, members of a group
might win a contract.
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We assume throughout that there would be a pool of ophthalmologists willing to participate in
the auction, with sufficient capacity to meet the needs of the population. Because Alberta
Health Services patients represent only about half of the business of Alberta ophthalmologists,
even losing bidders might remain in the market. It is possible, however, that losing bidders
would exit the market, leaving behind an insufficient number of bidders to make the system
succeed. Given this scenario, Alberta Health Services might consider modifications to promote
sustained competition. For example, it could use short contract periods, such as one week (or a
month). Patients authorized for surgery during that week would have to receive treatment from
a provider who would be authorized that week. The surgery would have to occur within a set
window of time, but would not have to be performed that week. This would smooth out use
across all providers who bid competitively. Losing bidders would not need to exit the market,
as they could always bid more competitively next time. (Non-strategic bidding at true costs
might result in exits, but such exits would be optimal.) Frequent bidding has its own risks,
however — for example, it might facilitate collusion (see Besanko et al. 2009). A second
modification would be for Alberta Health Services to encourage bidding from providers outside
the province, combined with long contract periods. Because entry costs for such providers
might be more than trivial, they might be attracted by contract periods of perhaps a year. This
would facilitate nationwide competition to serve Alberta.
TRANSITION PERIOD  
To ensure the new payment system worked smoothly, and to expose physicians and facilities to
the system before it took effect, perhaps a “practice round” of bidding could take place prior to
full rollout. Physicians would be informed of the outcome of the bids.
CONCLUSION 
Policy makers continue to wrestle with finding optimal strategies for procuring health care
services. Traditional procurement methods used in other sectors of the economy might not
work in health care due to a combination of unique characteristics. A range of approaches,
from cost-based payments to capitation, have different strengths and weaknesses that make
them appropriate for some health services but not others.
The current system of procuring cataract surgery in Alberta is particularly flawed. There are no
incentives to hold down prices, no rewards for boosting quality, and waiting lists are not
rationalized. Drawing on theoretical and empirical research, we propose a new approach for
procuring cataract surgery that relies on independent gatekeepers to identify candidates for
surgery, a competitive bidding process to set prices, and warrantees to assure quality. This
proposal should lead to more efficient production, higher quality, and more effective queuing. 
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